Paper Title
Impact Of Overboarded Directors On The Firm Performance: Evidence From Pakistan

Abstract
This study adds to the debate on the costs and benefits of overboarded directors by examining the effect of over-boarded directors on firm performance. Individuals sitting on several boards (or “busy” directors) demonstrate a greater inclination to be absent from board meetings and detrimental for firm performance. This study examines whether holding multiple outside board seats reduces a director’s capability to efficiently perform monitoring obligations by using a panel data set covering KSE index 100 firms listed from 2011 to 2014, after regression analysis study find a negative relation between the number of multiple appointments of independent directors and firm value, consistent with the busyness hypothesis. Past researchers argue that overboarded directors shirk their responsibility at the parent firm and are more likely to miss meetings due to extra workload and are less efficient fort the firm. The studies also report that such directors are less loyal to the firms and tend to resign in the bad times of the companies. The results are strong even after controlling for firm-related characteristics. Further study finding supports agency theory, which suggests that outside directors are the better monitors, and advocates that the increased number of outside directors on the board is beneficial for the firm. Keywords- Firm Performance, Director Busyness, Board Size, CEO Duality, Board Composition, Corporate Governance