Paper Title
The Dynamic (De) Figurativeness of Ai Within E–Nvironments of The New Natural in Comparison With the Transcendental Reduction of/by the Consciousness: Foundations of a Theory of Cognition

The paper examines a phenomenological problem of reducing data as inscribed into AI. This arrangement meritoriously shakes a claim that references to external data and created like by other subjects data are necessary, if AI is considered as a cognitive subject. Next, outlined examples of AI are standpoints initializing AI problem as a subject of the (de)figurativeness. Expanding e-nvironments of the natural of AI and limits of based on external data cognition are analyzed. Finally, the above twofold hypothesis is examined by a reference to the author’s theory of the phenomenological constitution of the «now». The inscribed consciousness is explained by reference to the natural and AI but a structural point of view is not preferred. Index Terms— Artificial Intelligence, e–nvironments, the dynamic (de)figurativeness, temporary principles.