Paper Title
Fiscal Federalism in Cameroon: A Tentative Approach

Abstract
On 1st January 1960, Cameroon obtained its independence. The country inherited a federal system left by the Franco-British administration. In 1972, and later in 1996, the country underwent two major reforms in the state structure, moving from a federal structure to a centralized unitary system on 20 May 1972, and then from a centralized unitary system to a decentralized unitary system on 18 January 1996. The goal of the decentralization system was to promote the development of local governments at the bottom to reduce their dependence on the central state. However, several decades after the implementation of decentralization in Cameroon, local governments still struggle to mobilize the financial resources needed to finance local public policies. They remain strongly dependent on transfers and subsidies from the central state. This is a failure of decentralization. By reviewing the literature on fiscal federalism, this paper shows that the setup of a new federal system in Cameroon contributes favorably to the increase of tax revenues within local governments through the strengthening of financial autonomy and decisional autonomy. Considering the findings of the first- and second-generation theories of fiscal federalism, this paper shows how a local government financing mechanism can be adapted to the specific conditions in Cameroon. We also analyze other theoretical and empirical findings, including some OECD countries having a federal structure and Nigeria. The analysis of the results drawn from the theoretical and empirical literature on fiscal federalism allows us to show that the setting up of a federal system and more precisely fiscal federalism constitutes an alternative way of improving the financing of the 360 communes of Cameroon. Keywords - Decentralization, Federal System, Fiscal Federalism, Local Government